


# MS-ISACTHREAT BRIEF

WV CYBER SECURITY OCTOBER 25, 2016

### MULTI-STATE INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER



The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has designated the MS-ISAC as its key cybersecurity resource for cyber threat prevention, protection, response and recovery for all U.S. State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) governments.




### WHO WE SERVE

### **MS-ISAC** Members include:

- All 56 US States and Territories
- All 78 federally recognized fusion centers
- More than 1,000 local governments and tribal nations

### State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial

Cities, counties, towns, airports, public education, police departments, ports, transit associations, and more



### How do you know you are a target?

### Knock, knock...



### WHY GOVERNMENT?



Criminals look for data.....

And governments have a lot of it!



### **AFFECTED ENTITIES**



### Vulnerabilities

Content Management
Systems

Plug In's

Server

Web Programming
Language



### Phishing

- ✓ Well Written
- ✓ Appear Credible
- ✓ Enticing or Shocking Subject
- ✓ Apparent Trusted Source

### CYBER THREAT ACTORS





**Nation-states** 



**Terrorists** 



**Cyber Criminals** 



**Hacktivists** 





**Insiders** 



### NATION STATE ACTORS/APT








### **APRIL - MAY 2016 NATION-STATE CAMPAIGN**

- 1 Campaign
- Targets predominantly ran Follett's Destiny software (K-12 schools)
- Total entities notified: 103

### **Impacted Entities**








TLP: AMBER

### **NATION-STATE SPEAR PHISHING**



### UKRAINE'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE





Boryspil International Airport – Kiev, Ukraine
Power Grid Shut Down
80,000 customers lost power for 6 hours
BlackEnergy Malware
IP Attributed to Russia




TLP: WHITE

### **CYBER CRIMINALS**





### TECH SUPPORT CALL SCAM





TLP: WHITE

### **BUSINESS EMAIL COMPROMISE**

- From the CEO or Senior Executive
- To someone in the finance department
- Sense of urgency
- Abrupt text normal to an email from a phone

Date:

FROM: CEO

**TO: Finance Department** 

**SUBJECT: Question** 

Are you available? Wire transfer needs to go out. Also what is the balance of General Funding Account? Let me know when you are ready. Reply as soon as possible.


Sent from my iPhone





### **Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital**


"The quickest and most efficient way to restore our system and administrative functions was to pay the ransom and obtain the decryption key. In the best interest of restoring normal operations, we did this."



### W-2 Phishing Campaign Targets States in Early-2016



### CREDENTIAL HARVESTING PHISHING EMAILS



### Spoofed email that appears as ESSW2@[targeted domain]


Subject: IMPORTANT TAX RETURN DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

Credential Harvesting Website



### **MS-ISAC INVESTIGATION**

- Opportunistic compromise of webpages running out-of-date versions of PHP
- Created mirrors of SLTT human resource web pages
  - These mirrored webpages URIs ended with "esslogin.htm"
- If a user follows the link in the phishing email, the user is directed to the compromised webpage and is prompted to log in
- Analysis of HTTP POST traffic indicates credentials entered (valid or not) are sent via Perl script to a hxxp://formbuddy.com account
- After the credentials have been submitted, the user is redirected to the legitimate targeted state website



### **HACKTIVISTS**



YOU HAVE BEEN



Doxing

Social,
Political &
Ideological
Agenda

System Compromise

DDoS Attacks

**Opportunistic** 



Targeted



Web Defacements



### **PERSONALITIES**



### **Home user/ Student:**

- script kiddies, lone hackers, hacktivists
- range of skills, TTPs and skills
- in it for the "lulz," fame, maybe financial gain

### **Business Man:**

- lone hacker
- range of skills, TTPs
- programmer, hacker-for-hire, botmaster



owners

actors

soldiers

### **Business:**

- Organized criminals, nation-states
- financial gain, espionage




### **COMMON MOTIVES AGAINST SLTTS**

Alleged Use of Excessive Force by LEO
Perceived Injustice
Alleged Animal Cruelty by LEO
Alleged Offensive Comments
Anti-Government



Opportunistic Unknown





### **COMMON CTA TTPS**



DDoS Attack
Doxing
Claimed SQLi
Website Defacement
Data Release
Claimed XSS




Compromised Computer/Server
Account Compromise
Spear Phishing
Phone Bomb
Scanning Activity



### **INSIDERS** Revenge Financial Guests Motivation **Trusted** Varying **Accidental** 3rd Expertise parties Power & **Former Employees** Control



### **EMPLOYEE MISTAKES**






TLP: WHITE

### **EVERYONE MAKES MISTAKES...**



The trick is to learn from them!



TLP: WHITE

## 



### 24 x 7 SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER

### Central location to report any cybersecurity incident

### Support:

- Network Monitoring Services
- Research and Analysis

### Analysis and Monitoring:

- Threats
- Vulnerabilities
- Attacks

### Reporting:

- Cyber Alerts & Advisories
- Web Defacements
- Account Compromises
- Hacktivist Notifications



To report an incident or request assistance:

**Phone**: 1-866-787-4722

Email: soc@msisac.org



### MONITORING OF IP RANGE & DOMAIN SPACE

### IP Monitoring

- IPs connecting to malicious C&Cs
- Compromised IPs
- Indicators of compromise from the MS-ISAC network monitoring (Albert)
- Notifications from Spamhaus

### **Domain Monitoring**

- Notifications on compromised user credentials, open source and third party information
- Vulnerability
   Management Program
   (VMP)

Send domains, IP ranges, and contact info to: soc@msisac.org



### **VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM**

### What Data Are We Collecting?

- Server type and version (IIS, Apache, etc.)
- Web programming language and version (PHP, ASP, etc.)
- Content Management System and version (WordPress, Joomla, Drupal, etc.)

Email notifications are sent with 2 attachments containing information on out-of-date and up-to-date systems:

- Out-of-Date systems should be patched/updated and could potentially have a vulnerability associated with it
- Up-to-Date systems have the most current patches



### SOLTRA EDGE

### Machine-to-Machine indicator transfer



To gain an account contact: VMP@cisecurity.org

### MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS PLATFORM

A web based service that enables members to submit and analyze suspicious files in a controlled and non-public fashion

- Executables
- DLLs
- Documents
- Quarantine files
- Archives

To gain an account contact: soc@msisac.org

### COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (CERT)

- Incident Response (includes on-site assistance)
- Network & Web Application Vulnerability Assessments
- Malware Analysis
- Computer & Network Forensics
- Log Analysis
- Statistical Data Analysis
- Penetration Testing

To report an incident or request assistance:

Phone: 1-866-787-4722

Email: soc@msisac.org



### **MS-ISAC** Advisories

This message was sent with High importance.

From: MS-ISAC Advisory Sent: Thu 10/15/2015 10:19 /

To: Thomas Duffy

Cc:

Subject: MS-ISAC CYBER SECURITY ADVISORY - Multiple Vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player Could Allow for Remote Code Execution (APSB15-25) - TLP: WHITE

### TLP: WHITE MS-ISAC CYBER SECURITY ADVISORY

### MS-ISAC ADVISORY NUMBER:

2015-119 - UPDATED

### DATE(S) ISSUED:

10/13/2015

10/15/2015 - Updated

### SUBJECT:

Multiple Vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player Could Allow for Remote Code Execution (APSB15-25)

### OVERVIEW:

Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player could allow remote code execution. Adobe Flash Player is a widely distributed multimedia and application player used to enhance the user experience when visiting web pages or reading email messages. Successful exploitation could result in an attacker compromising data security, potentially allowing access to confidential data, compromising processing resources in a user's computer, or remote code execution. Failed exploit attempts will likely cause denial-of-service conditions.

### THREAT INTELLIGENCE

There are currently no reports of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.

### October 15 – UPDATED THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Adobe is aware of a report that an exploit for the CVE-2015-7645 critical vulnerability is being used in limited, targeted attacks.

### MONTHLY NEWSLETTER

### Distributed in template form to allow for re-branding and redistribution by <u>your</u>

March 2016 Volume 11, Issue 3

Why Strong, Unique Passwords Matter



Monthly Security Tips Newsletter

### From the Desk of Thomas F. Duffy, Chair, MS-ISAC

Cybersecurity experts continually identify the use of *strong*, *unique* passwords as one of their top recommendations. However, this is also one of the least commonly followed recommendations because unless you know the tricks, it's difficult to remember *strong*, *unique* passwords for every login and website.

### Why Strong, Unique Passwords Matter

Cybersecurity experts make the recommendation for strong, unique passwords for several reasons – the first being that every day malicious cyber threat actors compromise websites and online accounts, and post lists of usernames, email addresses, and passwords online. This exposes people's passwords, and worse yet, they are exposed with information that uniquely

A strong password consists of at least 10, and includes a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols. A unique password is a password that is only used with one account.

### **NATIONAL WEBCASTS**

a collaborative effort between DHS and MS-ISAC to provide timely and relevant cybersecurity education and information

- Prioritize Your NIST CSF Implementation with the CIS Critical Security Controls (June)
- Internet of Things (April)
- 2016 Predictions from the MS-ISAC (February)
- Cybersecurity Year in Review and 2016 Preview (December 2015)
- National Cybersecurity Awareness Month: Tips for Staying Safe Online (October 2015)

https://msisac.cisecurity.org/webcast/



### WEEKLY MALWARE IPS AND DOMAINS

 From:
 MS-ISAC SOC
 Sent:
 Mon 11/30/2015

 To:
 MS-ISAC SOC
 Sent:
 Mon 11/30/2015

Cc:

Subject: Message from the MS-ISAC: Malware IPs and Domains observed by MS-ISAC 11/23/2015 - 11/29/2015 - TLP: GREEN

Message Pips of Interest 11-23 to 11-29.xlsx (35 KB)

Attached to this email is a list of IP addresses and domains associated with malware observed by MS-ISAC from 11/23/2015 - 11/29/2015 using the network security services.

Recipients may only share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels.

This list is produced from data collected by the MS-ISAC. Currently this data is being collected across a number of States and Local Governments.

The spreadsheet contains four tabs with the following information:

### 1. Malware IP Data

IP Address - This is either the IP address that is attacking a system or the IP address malware on an infected system is communicating with.

Counts - This is the number of alerts generated for malicious traffic to or from the IP address.

Country, Region, City - Location of the potentially malicious IP address.

ISP/Host - ISP or Hosting provider for the IP address.

Comment - Malware type or activity associated with the infection.



### **MS-ISAC CYBER ALERTS**

MS-ISAC Advisory

Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 at 2:57 PM

To: Thomas Duffy

TLP: WHITE MS-ISAC CYBER ALERT

TO: All MS-ISAC Members, Fusion Centers, and IIC partners

DATE ISSUED: June 16, 2016

SUBJECT: Malicious Email Campaign Targeting Attorneys Spoofs Emails From Statewide Legal Organizations - TLP: WHITE

In June 2016 MS-ISAC became aware of a malicious email campaign targeting attorneys, which spoofs emails from statewide legal organizations, such as the Bar Association and the Board of Bar Examiners. The subject and body of the emails include claims that "a complaint was filed against your law practice" or that "records indicate your membership dues are past due." Recipients are asked to respond to the claims by clicking a link which leads to a malicious download, potentially ransomware.

The emails are well written and appear to originate from the appropriate authority, such as an Association official, likely increasing their effectiveness. Reporting from various states indicates a likelihood that this campaign is personalized to individuals practicing in a particular state and may be progressing on a state-by-state basis. The following states have been referenced in public reporting on this campaign: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, and Nevada. This targeting may include attorneys working for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments.

### Recommendations:

MS-ISAC recommends the following actions:

- Share this information with potentially impacted organizations your area of responsibility, including Departments of Law/Justice, related law enforcement agencies, and agency-specific offices of counsel.
- Train government legal professionals in identifying spear phishing emails which may include spoofed email addresses, unusual requests, and questionable and/or masked links. This particular series of emails includes what appears to be a link to the state bar association, but when the user hovers over the link it shows that the link is really to a different website. Copying and pasting the link, instead of clicking on it, would defeat this social engineering attempt.
- Perform regular backups of all systems to limit the impact of data loss from ransomware infections. Backups should be stored offline.



### MS-ISAC INTEL PAPERS

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . Traffic Light Protocol: GREEN

### Multi State Information Sharing and Analysis Center Cyber Monthly Update

Information current as of May 31, 2016



Federal Awareness

(U) TLP: WHITE The

Center (NCCIC)/Indust

Review report highligh

capabilities in the 16 cr

their coordination effort

operations and upgradit

number of incident resp

reported vulnerabilities,

available at: https://ics-co

Year in Review FY2015 F

Insert your logo her

Traffic Light Protocol: WHITE

MS-ISAC Security Primer

Spear Phishing March 23, 2016, SP2016-0518

Other types of phishing include:

Smishing ("SMS phishing") involves a

message on a mobile device.

Voice over IP (VoIP) phones.

other high profile target.

user opening a malicious SMS, or text,

Vishing involves a cyber threat actor

attempting to gather information over

Whaling is a spear phishing attempt

directed towards a senior executive or

MULTI-STATE Information Sharing & Analysis Center

TLP: WHITE Overview: Cyber threat actors utilize phishing emails to compromise systems, networks, and/or gather information using social engineering techniques. A phishing email is designed to prompt a response from the recipient, such as clicking on a link or opening an attachment. Through the response, the recipient may download malware or be redirected to a website prompting them to provide sensitive information, such as login credentials, that will be sent to the cyber threat actors. Spear phishing involves a cyber threat actor sending targeted emails to a small group of users.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • Traffic Light Protocol: AMBER

MULTI-STATE & Analysis Center

### Information Sharing DESK REFERENCE

### **Quarterly Identified Cyber Threat Actor Review**

Information from October 1 to December 31, 2015

(U) TLP: AMBER This desk reference provides a review of the most active, identified1 Cyber Threat Actors<sup>2,3</sup> (CTA) and malicious cyber campaigns and operations from October 1 through December 31, 2015. The information in this document is provided to further the reader's

Traffic Light Protocol: WHITE MULTI-STATE Information Sharing & Analysis Center™

TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER

Timely Patching Reduces System Compromises pdating systems is one of the most important cyber security procedures to duting systems is one or the most important cyper security procedures to deep to protect a system from being compromised. Analysis of Multi-State ger to Protect a system from being compromised. Allianysis of Multi-State

Again Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) data proves that timely patching can prevent

updates address software vulnerabilities that may allow malicious cyber updates address software vulnerabilities mat may allow mancious cyber to information systems or a network. Once vulnerabilities are publicly

is as the disclosed information threat actors to find and target own that despite the proven systems often remain software and plugins for

The primary infection vector in at least 95% of all the incidents investigated by MS-ISAC was an unpatched vulnerability in an operating system, software, or plug

ctors exfiltrated data from an Italian company, which included curs exhitrated data iron an italian company, which included ploits that targeted vulnerabilities in common software. The Angler and the CryptoWall and Kovter malware in July 2015, incorporated the Cryptowan and kovter manware in july 2015, incorporated tely following its release to the public. The below graph shows the tely following its release to the public, the dates of patch releases and the attempted CryptoWall infections detected by MS-ISAC sensors. While a significant are the vulnerability is publically announced, a sharp decrease in ner the patch was released and installed.

MS-ISAC recommends nplementing a routine patching rogram and applying critical patches mediately after appropriate testing. Name cume Protector: White I formation may be distributed without restriction, subject to copyright controls.



### FEE BASED SERVICES

- Network Monitoring (Albert)
- Managed Security Services (MSS)
- Web application vulnerability assessments
- Network vulnerability assessments
- Penetration testing
- Phishing engagements
- Security assessments

For more info on any of these contact: info@msisac.org

### MS-ISAC ANNUAL MEETING



2016 Location...

San Antonio, TX!





### WHAT CAN YOU DO?

### Low Hanging Fruit!

- 1. PATCH!
- 2. Use defensive software
- 3. Back-up
- 4. Train users



### **Critical Security Controls**

- 1. Identify authorized and unauthorized devices
- 2. Inventory authorized and unauthorized software
- 3. Secure configurations for hardware and software
- 4. Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation
- 5. Controlled use of admin privileges





TLP: WHITE

### **IDENTIFY MALICIOUS ACTIVITY**

- Antivirus
- Firewalls
- IDS/IPS
- Logs (90 days!)
- Places to Look
  - Pastebin, Ghostbin, Zerobin
  - Twitter
  - Facebook
  - Google
  - SHODAN
- Things to Look For:
  - Announcements
  - Hashtags
  - Doxings





Hacktivist DDoS Claim



TLP: WHITE

### SHARE INFORMATION

### Be prepared


- Learn from others' best practices
- Gather intel to help you be proactive

### Be willing to ask for help

Identify other resources to augment what you are doing

### Be a part of the solution

Take part in information sharing



### WHO DO I CALL?



### Security Operations Center (SOC)

SOC@cisecurity.org - 1-866-787-4722
31 Tech Valley Dr., East Greenbush, NY 12061-4134
www.cisecurity.org

to join or get more information: https://msisac.cisecurity.org/memb ers/index.cfm



TLP: WHITE

### MS-ISAC CONTACT NUMBERS

### Thank You!

### Erin Dayton Erin.Dayton@Cisecurity.org

### **Security Operations Center**

24/7 Phone Number 1-866-787-4722 soc@msisac.org

### MS-ISAC HQ

Front Desk 518-266-3460

info@msisac.org

